Political Ideals Projected and Counter-Projected: Europe and a Globalizing USA[1]

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The paper examines the historical evolution of European notions of North America/US and North American/US notions of Europe, together with its impact upon how the USA and Europe relate to each other. The secular switch in dominance from Europe to the USA has turned the earlier US margin into a center and correspondingly left Europe struggling for an identity of its own. Furthermore, over time both sides have projected and counter-projected onto the other what became shared liberal and democratic ideals, which have gained in plausibility when envisioned in an abstract space beyond immediate experience. In the 20th century, these originally 'European' ideals have been re-formulated to underpin a US-led global order in which Europe has been accorded a marginal place. For the foreseeable future, then, the two relate awkwardly over their 'shared' values and interrelated identities: the American side tempted to coercive imposition of an empty dogmatism, the European side to ineffectual hypocrisy in claiming copyright over the same values. The USA has a need to be a more understanding center *vis-à-vis* Europe, and Europe a need to learn to make the best of its marginality *vis-à-vis* the USA.

Introduction: Identity, projections, and counter-projections from the margin

We know that Europe's identity exhibits a dynamic with that considerable part of the world where its colonial expansion has impinged over the centuries. This dynamic has been read back into Europe's relationship to its colonial and semi-colonial territories via the concept of 'orientalism' (Said 1978) and in the wealth of post-colonialism studies emerging with it. By showing America and Europe functioning as each other's 'Other', I want to argue that an analogous complex is present in the interplay between Europe's identity and that of North America/the USA. Indeed, it runs deeper, in so far as the US has reversed its former marginality, and still conditions US-Europe relations in recent history and for the foreseeable future.

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[1] This paper is a developed version of chapter 7 of Parker, Noel *The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins*, New York: Palgrave, forthcoming for 2008.

The concept of 'marginality' maps this complex onto Europe's and America's histories as centers of the order of the world. During its expansionist phase, Europe made many places and peoples *marginal* to itself: they became areas or cultures where Europe saw itself intruding, steering things, re-shaping, pushing towards modern, civilized life, and pushing back what was primitive and backward. Yet of all the areas Europe made margins of itself, none has run the gamut of possibilities as North America/the USA has. Originally it was regarded as territory empty of significant culture, to be peopled by Europeans. These European colonists then split from their own 'home'/origin/centre, and defined themselves as a distinct, but still 'European' society. In due course, that society came to be the dominant center for the globe, within which Europe was itself a margin. In the 20th century Europe's own Other returned, as it were, from across the Atlantic to re-order the world including Europe. Seen on the map of the world, then, Europe's identity first expands into the North American margin, and then in due course meets itself coming back from a new center of the world.[2]

The process was first visible as political thinkers construed their 'home' society with reference to another, North American space, where they chose to see certain possibilities beyond those 'at home'. Initially, Europeans thought North America *with reference to* Europe; but soon Americans began construing Europe *with reference to* America. The possibilities suggested might be the realization of some *good*--sharpening the claim for what *could and/or ought* to be the case at home, or the gratifying sense that a supposed good from home *could* or *would* be instituted at the other location. Or they could be a potential *bad* found in the other location--illustrating what we should *avoid* or *eradicate* at home.

In order to envision, advocate or condemn these possibilities, they are projected in thought to the other location, there to be sketched out freely, thanks to distance. In that sense North America/USA has been an 'Other' for Europe, and *vice versa*: distinct, yet close enough to function in defining

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[2] (Baudrillard 1988) explores subtly the European sense that the USA is the realization of Europe's own historic mission.

oneself[3]. The 'Other' of North America/USA has long performed a psychologically important function for European thinking: it has allowed Europeans to formulate how their identity either includes certain, as yet unrealized virtues, possesses characteristics that deserve to be reproduced elsewhere, or avoids some features found in the Other. I apply the term 'projection', then, where Europeans practice this play with the idea of North America/the USA (or America's *mutatis mutandis*): for the benefit of their own conception of Europe (or America), they *project* beyond the immediate reality to conditions which *may* hold or come about in the other imagined place. Advantageous as projection may be--or indeed unavoidable in the process of self-definition--it courts problems. Notably, the 'Other' whose identity is infused with projections from the first comes to have its own conceptions of reality and of itself: adopting the Other's conceptions, perhaps but with modifications, as exemplified *in itself*, and 'counter-projecting' the content of the initial projections. The projections 'bite back' in the interplay between European political thinkers' ideas on North America, and the analogous American/US ideas on Europe.

The Early history of European projections

The history of this interplay can be divided into two periods, according to who is on whose margin. One runs to the end of 19th century, by which time the 'colonial' relationship on the American side is fully superseded: North America/USA ceases to be either a colony or a former colony which exists on the liberated edge of Europe's colonial zones. For both Europe and the US itself, North American identity ceases to be grounded in its *likeness to*, *independence from*, or *idealized realization* at a distance of Europe's. America becomes less a mirror*,* on the margin of a world dominated by Europe; rather it is the new center of the world. Yet America continues to define itself in *terms* originally given it--or, as I prefer to say, 'projected' upon it--from Europe, terms which also therefore belong as well to Europe's self-identity. It has taken those 'European' terms and 'counter-projected' them to

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[3] This notion of the 'other' is wider than that classically used by Iver Neuman for the analysis of foreign relations with Russia, but also more positive (1999). For the 'other' is not only an object of fear and/or a target of security measures; it is a source of lessons to be followed and the object of love-hate feelings such as envy or emulation.

define itself in the world as the new 'European' center of the world, though itself quite autonomous of Europe.

I will follow two value pairs which have been particularly significant terms for the identity of both Europe and North America/USA: individualism and the market (the individual as an independent self-interested being, and the market as the space where such beings relate to one another--Elias 1991); and democracy and revolutionary change. Since the American Revolution, there have been states in the Western world legitimized by a supposed national will to choose their political order. There has been much conflict between competing claims to represent these values; but the values themselves have remained decisive (Parker 2000; Heller 1993). Both value pairs are hard to realize--which only encourages their projection onto elsewhere: the liberal individual and the liberal market are idealizations; revolutionary demands for 'democracy' are aspirations hard to realize or manage in practice.

Whilst positive expectations of the liberal market and of democracy are common ground between Europeans and Americans, I argue that differences arise according to which location one thinks the ideals from, and what imagined space they are projected onto. These differences surfaces as America moves from being an open margin for Europe's Enlightenment ideals to being a dominant center *vis-à-vis* the globe, including Europe. Where North America is Europe's margin open to the void of virgin territory, the ideals are adopted by the 'Europeans' on the margin. Where Europe is within the USA's margin to a fully occupied world, the spaces generated around Europe's and the US's centers can be neither straightforwardly mapped out side-by-side nor on top of each other. An intimate rivalry over how the world is to be ordered must ensue. This is the insight captured by considering how values are projected and counter-projected between center and margin.

As I have said, this story properly covers two periods. The first stretches from North America's growth as a colony to its separation and rise to equal status with European national states. The second begins with the USA's extension beyond its own continental sphere to become a center of the global as such. Space only permits a discussion of the second period, which

is the currently significant one. The first period can nonetheless be summarized.

America initially appealed to European thought because it could be regarded as a blank, devoid of *any* specific content[4]. Hence the soubriquet 'the noble savage' for the human beings imagined in that space (Ellingson 2001) and (Gillespie 2002). In that undefined space, natural human propensities could be imagined and purportedly observed, substituting the 'natural' for the authority of God and Church in an epistemological move often essential to Enlightenment thinking (Saint-Amand 1992). As political thinkers considered European socio-political conditions, the imagined condition of North America appeared at crucial points in their arguments as a malleable site to imagine what might otherwise be unimaginable.

Liberal thinkers in particular, such as John Locke and Adam Smith[5], projected a vision of naturally prosperous free-market individualism in North American space *rather than* in Europe. The freedom and openness of America's apparently virgin territory was crucial to the plausibility of the idea of free-market individualism. It made it possible to envision free individuals working on nature and voluntarily exchanging their products/property as best suited them, unhampered by the clutter of the socio-political constraints in European societies. European ideas of revolution and democracy underwent a parallel projection. Whereas Europe's late-18th-century experience left a memory of popular power as dangerous in itself and likely to evoke powerful opposition from established authority, the USA was thought--notably in the works of Thomas Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville--to be a place where a revolutionary drive for freedom from authority could succeed without cataclysmic collapse (see also Kahler & Link 1996). In this way, North America/USA exhibited key terms of various thinkers' notion of their own *European* society.

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[4] Montaigne's essay 'On Savages' gives a classic reflection on the relationship. See also Kroes' discussion of Columbus et al. (Kroes 1996:ch.1)

[5] In distinct ways: Locke wanted to spread a good set-up he finds already in parts of England; Smith wanted Europe to copy what he held to be already manifest in North America. But that is another story.

In its formative period, America was peopled by Britons and other Europeans, who regarded themselves as such.[6] With separation, then, the 'Europeans' in the colonies were happy to adopt into their self-identity the positive view projected from Europe. As they sought to become 'Americans', they could likewise turn that image *against* Europe: finding in themselves 'European' virtues which Europe itself lacked and which gave them the capacity to survive. Americans took these ideals to themselves with a sense of peculiar advantages of North America's space: that what was being realized amongst them could not have been realized in Europe. Their 'European' identity was thus counter-projected against Europe's own.

After a period of around 150 years, a crisis is signaled by Frederick Jackson Turner's 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History' (1893). Turner responded to the USA's running out of its own 'virgin' territory.[7] He sensed that this would end the strength which America enjoyed by comparison with Europe: the 'key to the historical enigma which Europe has sought for centuries in vain, and the land which has no history [the USA] reveals luminously the course of universal history' (Turner 1947, 11). If they were to survive, the ideals of individualism and democracy had to be embedded in a new setting without the advantages of uncontested North American territory. For Turner, this turn of events would undermine American democracy, which had been grounded in the way that '…native settler and European immigrant saw…the chance to break the bondage of social rank' (Turner 1947, 154). Turner worried over the way that big capitalism stultifies (Turner 1947, 155), and defensive legalism replaces the free spirit where territory was being opened up (Turner 1947, 269-89). For that American democracy which had been so prized belonged with small-town independence. It was built on what Paul Hirst described as ordinary citizens' 'ability to move, to escape local control…to shape their own destiny' (2005, 78). It had been this possibility which offered escape to Paine, and which Tocqueville presented so positively.

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[6] Revolutionary Founding Father though he is, Benjamin Franklin long harbored hopes for reform of the entire English empire led from the American colonies (Morgan 2003, ch.3).
[7] a fact signaled, Turner noted, by the US census' no longer recording westward expansion

Contending identities

In different ways, then, both Americans and Europeans had imagined positive North American versions of individualism in the market and of democracy that were conditional on the open, undisputed territory of the colonial margin into which 'European' society had extended. But in the 20th century, as North America definitively ceased to be a margin of Europe, both ideals were reconfigured in an American thinking imprinted upon the wider world, with Europe as a part. One could summarize--over-graphically--by saying that North America/USA has been Europe's 'child', which grew up, broke away from its parents (as children do) and then returned home full of ideas adapted from the parents' own hopes about who the parents *are* and how *they* should behave.

When North America's identity bites back, this must create tensions in the self-conception of the original projector, Europe, which become especially marked as the counter-projected material emanates from a center to which Europe itself is marginal. The originally projected features and values, as interpreted by the Other (America/USA), re-appear to the originator: an imposition from outside, but in terms recognizably its own, 'European'. This dynamic creates a peculiarly sensitive relationship between the identities of the projector, Europe, and the original object of projection, North America/USA. Each has made itself the center of the world according the same identity and values. Neither can easily surrender its sense of centrality. Yet neither can abandon to the other the terms in which its own identity has been defined (cf. Joenniemi 2005).

For those aware of existing on the margin of some other center, the order of the center is an inescapably external order which is nonetheless already present and has to be dealt with. Typical reactions on the margin are therefore wholesale, even contemptuous rejection of the center's identity and values, emulation of them (often in the hope of equaling or outdoing the center's realization of them), or aspiring to be an alternative center in greater/clearer/more exemplary possession of them. Both rejection and emulation can be seen in what is widely, if sweepingly referred to in the loose

pair: 'anti-' and 'pro-'Americanism'. [8] The expressions capture a range of positions critical/dismissive/hostile, or favorable towards what is deemed to be typical of American society, culture, politics and/or foreign policy (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, ch.1). As US/America comes to dominate the world including Europe, strong anti- or pro-American reactions are inevitably found.

The psychological interplay between what I here analyze in terms of the US *center* and the European *margin* has also been captured in the setting of wider society by cultural history studies of European attitudes to the US. Partly because he begins with the USA's deliberate post-WWII attempts to convey to Europe a positive view of the USA and its values, a historian such as Richard Pells brings out the ebb and flow between 'incursions' of American culture into Europe and European assimilation and/or ripostes to it (Pells 1997). After WWII, there were two grounds for the newly visible cultural incursion: the flow of American goods, accompanied by American styles, from the world's then biggest exporter; and a conscious (and arguably necessary) strategy to hold the fractious, nationalistic states of Europe together in a Cold-War ideological framework for a globe shaped by American power and wealth. In this ideological flow and counter-flow, Pells notes (1997:154), each side experienced the sensitivities of self-identities looking for their place in the world.

> [I]t had always been important, psychologically and culturally, for Europeans and Americans to translate their differences into a form of disparagement. Each needed the other for self-definition. Everyone needed someone else, preferably someone demonstratively inferior, or order to feel special.

Yet in the USA's diplomatic relations with Europe the feeling of teaching Europe the right way was far from new. The USA's arrival on the scene of world politics in World War I and the subsequent peace fuelled a sense – on both sides of the Atlantic – of the USA coming from outside Europe's bloody imbroglio to reorganize Europe's world on fresh principles. As one young American diplomat at the Paris conference wrote: 'Before we

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[8] The addition of '-ism' in the terms suggests analytical limitations which it is important to be aware of: they lump together many diverse positions and is frequently used to *undermine* opponents' views as unreasoned, ideological postures (Hollander 1992).

get through with these fellows over here we will teach them how to do things right and how to do them quickly.'[9] This takes me to the phases of America's 20th-century accession to global centrality over Europe.

America's 20th-century globalizing values

Début: WWI to Isaiah Bowman

From about 1890 to 1917, the USA became increasingly active on the international scene beyond its own borders (Weidenfeld 1996, 26-34). On the one hand, it pursued its interests militarily in the wider world: the Phillipines, Mexico, Cuba, China[10]. It came in the process into conflict with European colonial powers (Spain, Prussia and Great Britain). But by 1910, it had placed itself somewhat hesitantly amongst the friends of the most successful colonial power, Britain, and joined her in war (Kahler and Link 1996, 7-10). Its proximity to European imperial power called for a new configuration of American identity that could underpin this world role without contradicting the earlier identity.

This can be seen in the myth surrounding President Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' in the Versailles Peace Treaty and its program for a new world order. Delivered as a speech to Congress the year before Wilson set out for the Paris, the Points secured a genuine popular following for Wilson in Europe and were frequently (even if abusively) referred to as participants argued their corner during the conference (Macmillan 2001). Wilson himself returned home hoping he had largely seen them into practice.

Surprisingly perhaps in view of subsequent history, the Points were formulated in sympathy with the *Russian* people, confronted with the harsh terms of the Germany and Austro-Hungary as the new Soviet government sought at the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk to extricate the country from the war. Against this background, Wilson castes the United States, and himself as its head, in the populist role of voice of peace-loving people's the world over.

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[9] Quoted in (Macmillan 2001:22)
[10] where it joined the European powers in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion.

There is…a voice calling for…definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people.…Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind.

Wilson's Points thus purport to be the articulation of the peoples' voice crying out for war to end. They first state principles of open diplomacy, freedom of the seas and of trade, the removal of armaments as instruments of international relations for the future. They then offer recognition and security to all the nations that had come to attention in the War: first, Russia, then Belgium, France, Austro-Hungary, Rumania, Serbia, Turkey, Poland etc. The whole is topped off with a 'general association of nations' (the League of Nations as it became), where peace-loving nations could resolve matters by mutual consent.

The Points expressed deep skepticism over imperialism and Europe's interstate order in general – only publicly referred with reference to the Central Powers, but known perfectly well to hold for the other major European belligerents. A frequent American theme in the negotiations was that national self-determination with US blessing was to supersede the balance between big imperialistic powers. This emerges even more clearly in the so-called 'Four Principles' speech with its opposition to 'peoples and provinces [being] bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty…' (Wilson 1924:477-8). The American expectation was, indeed, to replace the earlier Old World inter-state politics.

It is too easy to mock American diplomacy at this time for ignorance (at times perhaps willful ignorance) of the wider world's many rivalries and incipient nations – and to attribute the ultimate failure of inter-war international order to the contradictions in its principles. As Macmillan observes, many not necessarily compatible expressions for self-determination appear in Wilson's own writings: 'autonomous government', 'the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their government', 'the rights and liberties of small

nations' etc (Macmillan 2001:19). Underpinning Wilson's/America's self-righteous but genuinely popular position of principle was, however, a conception that free association and democratic government could be transposed from the North American to the world setting. Wilson's principles, he also wrote, were 'for every peace-loving nation which, *like our own*, wishes to live its own life [and] determine its own institutions' (*ibid*. – emphasis added)

In short, Wilson gave the world and the US public (albeit short-lived) a universally replicable version of American identity, with which the world might be re-organized: the 'American Dream of freedom & self-determination' (Weidenfeld 1996, 29). In Wilson's formulas we find the earlier values from shared European thinking: the private pursuit of the good life through commerce--the liberal-market strand; and the capacity of a people to reform their society from below--the revolutionary democratic strand. In terms of my wider story of re-centering the world, then, we can see that Wilson's thinking took Europe's earlier projections as envisioned for the open spaces of North America, and re-cycled them for the globe and its peoples in their entirety. This move lies at the heart of globalization as promoted by the USA from its arrival on the world scene: to take easy commercial, social and political relations between free individuals from the North American margin and extend its order over the world as a whole. We can observe it more fully in America's inter-war formulation of new world geography.

Neil Smith's 2003 study has shown Isaiah Bowman, who was chief US adviser at the conference, to have been an iconic figure in the longer-term reconfiguration of the world in the USA's inter-war thinking. An adviser to presidents from Wilson to Roosevelt, Bowman recast the geography of the world in terms adapted to America's rising world power and the slow collapse of Europe's world role. He constituted what Smith calls the 'prelude to globalization' in American thinking. Bowman's single most influential text, *The New World: problems in political geography*, which went through many editions in the 1920s and '30s, pursued an agenda to provide 'the men who compose the government of the United States' with 'scholarly consideration to the geographical and historical materials that go into the making of…foreign

policy' (Bowman 1928, iii). Bowman conveyed a 'political geography' for the USA's new international position.

The book surveys the zones of the world with a view to the problems they present. In effect, this means the risk of impediments to US trade arising from conditions on the ground following WWI: the threat of war, civil disturbance, failure of credit, blockages to transport and trade, and so on. In this formulation the commercially minded American's impatience with obstructive Old World attitudes can already be heard. On boundaries, for example, Bowman notes 'that people are more inclined to fight about differences arising from contrasts in language, religion, nationality, and race than about economic objects.' (Bowman 1928, 33).

The point becomes clear in Bowman's last chapter, on the problems of the United States itself. The opening poses the frontier experience of the USA's earlier self-concept:

> …independence and self-reliance...are especially helpful when pioneers are breaking down the obstacles of a wilderness. Can they now be turned…[to] the subtler problems of national spirit and of foreign relationships? (Bowman 1928, 685).

The need to confront those problems arises from the USA's transformation to an industrial economy, where the impediments become 'world problems' of resources and trade. It is the business of the United States to ensure 'steady and rapid advance into all the world's markets to satisfy both our needs and our desires' (1928, 691-3). The image of America as a haven from European obstructions to normal (that is to say, commercial) development, emerges as clearly as for Federalist writers of the American Revolution.

> …distance from older European communities gave the United States a detached view of conditions and quarrels that repeatedly shook Western Europe to its foundations. (Bowman 1928, 705)

Under these conditions, the USA had already developed a relationship to the Western Hemisphere which was *innocent* because it was commercial: '…[T]he early international life of the nation was remarkably simple…. Indeed the whole world was young…' (Bowman 1928, 710). Deriving his position from Fraser, Bowman reasons that by the time 'the pioneer had occupied most of the empty spaces and pretty well rounded out the inhabitable world', the

United States had national unity grounded upon Enlightenment ambitions of legality and means of communication. Fraser

> …finds at work two great forces which…leave the nation stronger…the often rival and divergent sectional interests, and…a common historical inheritance, a common set of institutions, similar laws, a common language, a truly American spirit, and a body of American ideals. (Bowman 1928, 707)

Under the heading 'Foreign relations imposed by civilization', Bowman then expounds a *world* role for the USA founded in relationships unlike the colonial ones of the European powers:

> While the world basis on which commerce had been organized to serve a complex civilization had largely displaced the purely nationalistic basis of commerce, the World War interrupted the natural trends of commerce…The European nations have become so absorbed in their mutual relations… (Bowman 1928, 732)

The American nation will not will act in the world as the Europeans do, however. 'This state of affairs may be expected to have little effect upon the extension of American influence abroad', For Americans are heedless of territorial aggrandizement: 'The American habit of thought in relation to international things is not imperialistic; it is commercial and it seeks above all commercial equality.' (Bowman 1928, 732). Provided equal access to commercial possibilities, Americans can extend their trade with minimal top-down order.

> The advice of George Washington…is still a widely held principle in our public life. No government will be supported that advocates intimate relationship with European problems, which are interpreted as quarrels. (Bowman 1928, 745)

Hence, the modest commercial egalitarianism which informs the USA post-WWII stipulations to the European powers: '…the same trading rights and privileges as the subjects of the mandatory powers.[11]' (Bowman 1928, 739). But this commercially inspired egalitarianism in international relations can only

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[11] That is, the European powers granted defeated states' territories under a 'mandate'.

work in a world of independent states, which freely choose a mutually beneficial relationship with the USA. That is to say, a world of (in Wilson's formulation) self-determined nations freely seeking beneficial commercial relationships with others.

For the USA's entry onto the world stage Bowman relocated the frontier-grounded image beyond North America's territorial limits. The earlier 'natural' extension of willing, mutually beneficial relationships between parties pioneering virgin territory recurs in analogous relationships between commercial actors and between nations. Reading Bowman, we can see how America's inherited self-identity, with its 'European' terms, was transposed from the free edges of the known world to the known world as a whole. The freedoms envisaged at the frontier were preserved: to decide for oneself, to shift one's trading relationships, and to alter things around. Thus the two key value-sets adopted from the Enlightenment persisted in an American identity for the new global setting. They survive with their shortcomings in tact: notions of individualism, the market and democracy, made credible by being spared specific context, which can thus be imagined without the constraints of real location or a real framework.

America's Post-WWII world leadership: Morgenthau & universal values

The inter-war history of America's involvement with the wider world is familiar. On the one hand, US political institutions themselves got cold feet when it came to institutionalized commitments, notably to the League of Nations. On the other hand, hands-free steering by American finance drew in upon itself after 1929, leaving frightened national governments to fall back dysfunctionally upon the deflationary disciplines of the Gold Standard (Kindleberger 1973). From that experience, Karl Polanyi drew the influential conclusion that a global financial framework without an institutional/political one could not maintain market society, domestic or international.[12]

The post-1945 environment of greater than ever destruction in Europe and the unique post-war economic, military and political strength of the US was a good setting to take Polyani's point. If there was a dominant power in

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[12] '[T]he origins of the cataclysm [of between the wars] lay in the utopian endeavour of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system' (Polanyi 1957, 29)

the world it was that of the USA. US engagement in world-level institutions, values and military power were hardly avoidable. So the US chose to integrate itself into world-level order: accepting involvement in multilateral global institutions (though it might chaff at them); and even fostering the subsidiary integrations of other parts of the world--notably Western Europe (Kahler and Link 1996, 35-95). This time, the US was at the centre of shaping a world order: the UN, the system of military alliances and the multilateral 'Bretton Woods' system – all to defend 'democratic, capitalist systems tied...into an international economic order led by the United States'.[13]

The European/American ideal of individuals in democratic market society was accordingly pressed into service as a legitimation for institutionally-wielded *power*. For, regardless of what strategy they proposed, Cold War American policy-makers assumed that the USA's world-level dominance was grounded in the universal acceptance of the same values as for Wilson and Bowman. The argument of George Kennan's 'Long Telegram', which initiated US Cold War thinking, is that the Soviet Union is *unique* in its hostility to the outside world and incurable irrationality. The rest of the world knows full well 'that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible….Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause.'(Kennan 1946). Likewise, the definitive National Security Council of 1950, though it emphasized military and security priorities against the threat, also presupposed the same world-level value consensus:

> [T]he marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society….is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system….By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it. (NSC 68: United… 1950:iv)

Bowman's positioning of America in the wider world survived, then, but at the cost of a new ambivalence for the US position. The US was now *both*

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[13] Catherine Mcardle Kelleher, 'America's European Agenda: Learning from the Past and Creating a Future' in (Haftendorn and Tuschhoff 1993, 147-165), p. 151

an innocent party in a world à la Wilson/Bowman, *and* a hegemonic party overstepping its own and others' boundaries in the global institutions of finance, government and military power. In the inherited ideals, the individual interests of free parties appeared as sufficient to organize a world. Now, instead of being one amongst many promoting of its own *and* the common good in easy accord, the USA was a uniquely powerful wielder of power over world order as a whole. The very dominance of the US over a known world challenged the image of peaceable, freely choosing individuals and nations as envisioned on the free margins of human society.

The problem of the universality in the use of power at world level is a theme of American Cold War international relations' central, Hans Morgenthau. While grounded in the unattainability of rational certainty of any kind, Morgenthau's realism expresses some nostalgia for universal values (cf. Knutsen 1997:243f.; Little 2003). [14] This can be seen in the very structure of his classic *Politics among Nations*, with its telling subtitle: *The Struggle for Power and Peace*. After seven parts on the struggle for, and limitations of national power, Morgenthau reaches a turning point in his logic, which reflects the post-WWII situation: the national players in international politics must somehow establish mutual peace (Morgenthau 2005, 396-7). The remaining three parts of the book consider peace through agreed self-limitations, through transformation[15], and through accommodation. Like Hobbes, Morgenthau the realist commends institutions to realize the universal value of peace in a world preoccupied with the pursuit of power: acknowledging the primacy of disorder (individual national power), but hoping that it may be softened with justice from universal institutions.

The tension between individual nations' values and universal values is more evident in Morgenthau's contributions to debates on American foreign policy, of which he was often critical. Whilst American interests cannot but be uppermost, he wanted the USA to straddle its interests and the claims of universal peace. In contrast to the inter-war thinking of a Bowman, to be sure, individual interests can no longer be plainly innocent and sufficient for the

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[14] According to an insightful analysis of (Tjalve 2005), Morgenthau can be seen in the Christian utopian American tradition, as a sort of 'Jeremiah' advocating what he knows to an unachievable human perfection.

[15] Morgenthau is especially impressed by functional integration in Europe – ch. 30

global order. On the other hand, a truly universal alternative good is simply not achievable. So the best one can hope for is to limit the damage: while the moral man in politics 'is precluded from acting morally, the best he can do is to minimize the intrinsic immorality of the political act.' (Morgenthau 1958, iii,16). Hobbes, you might say, without the Leviathan to resolve the war of all against all. [16] But there is plenty of room for 'national moralities' unscrupulously to *lay claim* to the universal with 'national moralities…which endeavor to invest the interests of a particular nation with the sanction of universal moral principles.' (Morgenthau 1958, iii,18).

In this world picture, America's national interests deployed over the wider world, should *chime advantageously* with the universal. A 1951 essay 'A Positive Approach to Democracy' (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 237-247), makes explicit America's dilemma, and advocates an understanding of others' positions that is decent, possible to legitimize, *and* advantageous: 'To define [the absolute good] is the job of philosophy; it is for politics to understand, *and to make use of*' the relative good. (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 237--emphasis added). Since democracy, for example, is *not* universal currency, the aim of foreign policy should be first to understand its meaning to others,[17] and then to make US foreign policy *appear* consistent with those other meanings.

> The ability of Western democracy to speak effectively to the peoples of Europe and Asia is dependent upon its ability to establish two different relationships: one between the aspirations of those peoples and the political policies of the West, the other between those policies *and their verbal propagation*. (Morgenthau 1958, iii,245) (emphasis added)

Morgenthau's thinking is then confronted, as Bowman's was not, by an cleft between US national interests, others' national interests, and truly universal interests. He appreciated that, as world hegemon, the US could not be one amongst others in a peaceable value consensus. But universality as such was most probably synthetic. His compromise position was to advocate the pursuit of the USA's own advantage in international politics by promoting

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[16] Compare the moment in *Leviathan*, ch.14 when Hobbes introduces the Nature Law 'to seek peace' where means are available.
[17] Morgenthau has in mind aspirations for interventionist progressive governments in the Third World. See also 'The Decline of Democratic Government' (Morgenthau 1958, iii,90-100)

its values *as universal values* for the wider world, even though such a thing could hardly exist. [18]

Market and democracy as world order after the Cold War

With the disappearance of the US/West's only military challenger US globalizing values could be thought undisputed throughout the world (Fukuyama 1992). Amid expectations of a 'New World Order', a considerable literature appeared from foreign policy elites, optimistically propounding how the harmony of US-European values could be articulated in the US-Europe relationship (Haftendorn and Tuschhoff 1993; Haley 1999; Weidenfeld 1996, 97-34; Kahler and Link 1996, 29-107). As earlier in opposition to Communism, ideological legitimation stemmed from the idealized values articulated across the European-American relationship: liberal, market individualism and democracy. In relation to Europe, proponents of the US-led global order have since shown every tendency to adopt Morgenthau's solution to the tension between nation-state interests and universal values. They defined Europe as a particular kind of supplement to American-led global power, bringing precisely ideology/values, money and institutional mechanisms to supplement the USA's coercive power (Brzezinski 1997; Brzezinski 2005; Mead 2002). As between Europe and America, there might be disagreement over institutional mechanisms, but consensus over the core values.

From early on, some American voices anticipated that consensus around American/European values could not alone contain contention in the world or eclipse the potential for armed conflict between empire and nationalism (Snyder 1991; Motyl 1999), or between competing civilizational blocs (Huntington 1996). By the late-1990s the coercive dimension of US-centered global power revived, and with it notions of a subordinate *militarily* limited role for Europe. Given the common ground, coercion was not to be directed *against* Europe (if we except ex-Yugoslavia, in the south-east borderlands), though a sharp eye was kept on integration in a refocused NATO.

It is plain enough that '9/11', and the construction put upon it have reinforced a conception of coercive US-led world order after the model of the

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[18] See, e.g., 'The Decline of American Power' (Morgenthau 1958, ii,46-55)

Cold War (Buzan 2006). 'Terrorism' and/or 'terrorists' fulfill a role analogous to that occupied earlier by the world-wide threat of communism. The War on Terror is waged against a new limit to the US-led liberal global order (Barnett 2004). The US decision to concentrate on military and security countermeasures was bound to reinforce the American trend to define others in a subordinate military function, recently rehearsed with somewhat more rancor than earlier: as in the controversy unleashed by US defense-secretary Rumsfeld's 'New v. Old Europe' remarks when some European countries' refused to join in the Iraq war; and in Robert Kagan's Mars v. Venus analogy (Kagan 2003).

But while such talk caused offence amongst many Europeans, it was still grounded in the belief in a common trans-Atlantic *value*-base. '…Americans believe in power,' argued Kagan (2003, 41), 'they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order'. The problem for America was that Europeans had lost sight of the necessity to maintain the global order with *both* common ideals *and* coercion (Kagan 2003, 57). The US center, more fearful and more inclined to coerce, became more autocratic in its handling of its European margin.

Europe's space in America's world

For a margin (to repeat the introduction), the order of the center is an inescapably external order which must nonetheless be negotiated with. Accordingly, typical reactions for marginal identities are rejection, emulation, or aspiring to be an alternative center. Counter-projection is an important move in any these. For Europe, the first of those responses is awkward due to the European margin's historical commitment to the same value-order as the new American center. Rejection can be complex: requiring for example that acknowledgement of the USA's achieving 'Europe's' modernizing ambition be mixed with rejection of those same ambitions in spite of their centrality to Europe's own identity (Baudrillard 1988). Emulation is a possible course, though it entails 'learning' from outside that which already 'belongs to us'. Nonetheless, thoughtful analysis of what Europe can learn from America's historical experience continues to be possible (Siedentop 2000). This leaves

the option of defining oneself as an alternative center, which also involves the highest degree of counter-projecting an identity upon the intruding center.

We can see Europeans' views pursuing all these reactions to a perception of America's position in relation to Europe (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007; Meunier 2005) (Nolan 2005), all of which entail projection onto 'America' of a certain identity in relation to Europe, an implicit positioning of Europe as better (or worse) in relation to that (Rensmann 2006). A natural corollary, consistent with measured anti-Americanism, is renewed idealizations of a Europe with the same universal values as America, only better. The recently most favored ingredients for that strategy have been the European Social Model, and 'soft' or 'normative' power--the latter notably including Europe's way of promoting in the wider world 'American/European' ideals of democracy and human rights.[19]

The notion of a specifically 'European Social Model' was especially canvassed in the 1990s to identify *European* market society as against the more liberal version of the USA and, to some extent, Britain (Holland 1994; Esping-Andersen 1990). Researchers even assigned it an integral status in Europe's history (Klausen and Tilly 1997) and social structure (Galbraith, Conceição and Ferreira 1999). A string of policy or charter documents promoting a European welfare version of the market economy has likewise been a feature of EU-level politics. But these have frequently been bones of contention between the different EU member states, and their impact on both national welfare states and on the advance of liberal globalization remains doubtful (Kuhnle 2000; O'Connor 2005). Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the specifically European version of the market society, in which equality and welfare are explicit objectives of government, does appear as an idealization in a European self-identity that is contrasted with that of the USA.

Notwithstanding US suspicion that Europe is merely finding excuses for ignoring the need for hard power with soft (Kagan 2003; Nye 2004), soft power is often celebrated as a *distinctive* feature of Europe's manner on the

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[19] *Either* Western European Christianity *or* secularism might be added, but not of course both. The indecisive outcome of the recent EU debate on Christianity in the constitutional convention suggests, however, an unresolved tension within Europe over its own religiosity – further indicated by the open sore regarding Europe's relationship to Turkey and to Islam (Goody 2003; Klausen 2005; Nielsen 1999). Some US commentators have gone so far as to see incapacity to deal with religion as the peculiar feature of Europe (Weigel 2005)

world stage as the USA's. The claim is made that Europe enjoys a particular kind of international influence precisely because it is *not* motivated by a narrow, national will backed with military capacity and coercive diplomacy. Hence, the effectiveness attributed to initiatives such as the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria of good governance. This 'normative power' (Manners 2002) makes a virtue of Europe's necessity. It reverses the problem of Europe's lack of coherent international identity (especially compared with the USA): foreign-policy indecisiveness reappears as high-minded respect for international consensus over generally persuasive principles. A parallel route to the same goal has been to argue that Europe's peculiar lesson for the world lies in its very *lack* of singular, state-like identity. This distinguishes Europe as perceived by third parties from the all-too-monolithic and coercive USA, and construes Europe as a model for politics in a globalized world (Haseler 2004; Cooper 2003, 153-172; Garton Ash 2004: 54-94).[20]

European philosophers have shown the deeper thinking that can underpin these political balances. Jørgen Habermas, long chary of nation-state framework for democracy (Habermas 1996), developed a political theory adapted to the 'post'-national state arguably to be found in Europe (Habermas 2001, 58-113; Goode 2005). At the time of the 2002 Iraq War, he joined Jacques Derrida[21], as doyen of French post-structuralist thought, in a public statement of Europe's proper identity in the world (Habermas and Derrida 2003). They recognized that it was difficult for Europe to be the unique site for cosmopolitan values now proclaimed throughout the world. The continued strength of national perspectives in Europe was a problem for any preaching about compromise-building (Habermas and Derrida 2003, 294). Yet, Europe having overcome so many authoritarian national governments in the past, they nonetheless proclaimed a special role for Europe *as against* the USA in advancing these values.

> At the international level…, Europe has to throw its weight on the
> scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the

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[20] It remains arguable whether even this, softened form of Europe's international identity can escape the tension that Morgenthau described, between speaking for a general good and serving one particular 'national'/European interest (Diez 2005).
[21] Whose own later philosophical inquiries also addressed the discourse underpinning soft-power activities such as peace-building (Derrida 2001).

United States…[I]t should exert its influence in shaping the design for the coming global domestic polity. (Habermas and Derrida 2003, 293)

More radically perhaps, Etienne Balibar has also sought to turn Europe's marginal position into a force for good in the world. Europe can best satisfy the calls of American liberal opinion *and* the wider world, he argues, by living out its status as a 'borderland': a place where agency does *not* arise in the form familiar to the international arena, of fixed identity and exclusive command of resources (Balibar 2003, 323). In place of the competitive players of power politics, the very indeterminacy of Europe enables it to promote 'ensembles' capable of mediating across the fault-lines of the globe (Balibar 2003, 323f.).

Conclusion: Center and margin in the Transatlantic Relationship

It is clear from the history and analysis of this paper that tensions over claims to 'own' the European/American heritage of values will continue. Given the long-term center-margin dynamics that have been my theme, how can we expect America and Europe to behave, and what can we expect of the values which they have projected upon each other?

We have seen how the globalizing 20th-century USA sought to reshape the world, leaving Europe as a margin of its own earlier projected idealizations. In the initial European projections of the liberal market society and of democracy, North America functioned as the void where ideals could be projected. But in the 20th-century American projection of those same ideals, the open space envisaged is not a 'void' but the global as such, for which those ideals become organizing principles. The original conceptions as supposed realizable in North America had relied upon their being exercised in autonomous margins, free from constraint and peripheral to overall order. Recycled to a role in the Cold War order and after, the globalizing ideal of the liberal market *with* democracy has extended over the world in a way that makes it hard for Europe--and others (Friedman 1994)--to place themselves.

What conditions does the USA's still rising universalistic hegemony in the world pose for Europe's self-identity? Or, in the manner that I have formulated that issue here, how do those living on the European margin

negotiate an identity for Europe when some of the most attractive ideals have been bequeathed on to the now increasingly dominant North American center/child/other? Whereas America had earlier to *acquire* for itself a definite identity and location; Europe has rather had to *adjust* its previous identity to a location on the edge of the America's space. In 20th- and early 21st-century projections, Europe is defined from the US perspective as a supplement in the extension of 'American/European' values to the global order. Europeans sometimes seek to define Europe as an alternative, better rooted ideological center--though, if put to the test, this might reproduce the cant universalizing of Europe's earlier history, currently seen in its American version. European identity remains problematic, then: bearing the same universal values, but likely to be swept up as the margin of the US-centered global construction. Hence, persistent attempts, fragile as they may be, to carve out *within* those values a distinctive European identity alongside North America.

As regards Europe's and America's shared ideals themselves, one finding from my readings was that they are natural material for projection and counter-projection. That tactic was encouraged from the start by the limitations of the ideals if articulated within space subject to territorial or societal limits. 'American/European' values looked at their best when projected into unbounded space: at one time the empty frontierlands, latterly the abstraction of a globalized world. The persuasive power of the ideals in the world at large will always be limited by their having all along leaned on projection into indeterminate space, where the absence socio-political framing enhances their credibility. Ideals projected off into marginal space may well become more persuasive, but they tend also to be more vapid in themselves, and more like to become mere dogma. Though the temptation lies more with the dominant center at any time, i.e. currently the USA, dogmatism has certainly been seen many times in the history of Europe's/America's ideals.

As against this, one must remember the virtue of the margin's position: the capacity to challenge the center 'on the margins' with break-away or innovation. That was the fate of Europe's ideals projected to North America in the first place: to take on an independent life there away from the original source. The process can recur wherever the margin exploits its freedom to loosen and rearrange the center's ideas, as in what is also known as

'creolization' (Hannerz 1989; Pieterse 2004). Furthermore, as Rob Kroes has shown, creolization *has* occurred both in North America's reception of European ideals and – though less frequently – in Europe's re-acquisition of the same from America. Now that American culture is an 'unavoidable presence' in Europe, 'What is happening is an act of cultural appropriation, an experiment in creative identification with…admired examples.' (Kroes 1996:173)

This insight can be extended to provide the moral of our story for the field of US-Europe foreign relations. Both margin and center, both Europe and America, have a need to understand how the relationship of the two can be turned to good use. For there are inherent risks, which a good margin-center relationship can counter, lying in wait for whoever is able to feel a power to shape the world. The risks can be seen in the relationship of coerciveness to dogmatism, and of universalism to hypocrisy. First, just being central offers the center scope, and arguments for being coercive. But for those away from the center, coerciveness confirms the dogmatism in the center's viewpoint. Hence, the plausibility of the slightly woolly-minded European view that *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world indecisiveness is a virtue in itself. Secondly, to pronounce on universal values is to court the risk of hypocrisy in the wider world: the hypocrisy of preaching neutrality while pursuing private interests, or of advocating empty ideals with no purchase on the listeners' reality. The worst combination of outcomes for either the USA, Europe or the West is therefore to be hypocritical, dogmatic *and* coercive.

The antidote to these temptations--as Balibar's argument can be seen to suggest--is sensitivity to others' marginality, and to one's own for others: that is to say, awareness that at the margins firm views appear as dogmatism, and coerciveness merely reinforces that impression; awareness that any point of view may be imprisoned in interests or have only a limited purchase upon experience at the margin. Where the relationship between margin and center is at its best, the margin exploits its freedom to challenge and re-formulate values that are both its own and related to those of the center, and the center acknowledges that the margin does this to some purpose. Put briefly, in the transatlantic relationship, America should learn to value and sustain its

European margin, and Europe should learn to value and sustain its marginality.

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